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We claim that the meaning of the adverbial almost contains both a scalar
proximity measure and a modal that allows it to work sometimes when
proximity fails, what we call the at-a-distance reading. Essentially, almost
can hold if the proposition follows from the normal uninterrupted out-
comes of adding a small enough number of premises to a selection of rel-
evant facts. Almost at-a-distance is blocked when the temporal properties
of the topic time and Davidsonian event prevent normal outcomes from
coming true when they need to.
This approach to almost differs from the two general approaches that
have emerged in the literature, by replacing the negative polar condition
(not p) with a positive antecedent condition that entails not p while avoid-
ing the numerous well-documented complications of employing a polar
condition. Since this approach to almost involves a circumstantial base with
a non-interrupting ordering source, almost behaves in certain ways like the
progressive, and shows contextual variability of the same kinds that we see
with premise sets.
1 Introduction
The adverbial almost has a clear intuitive meaning, but has proven very difficult
to reconcile with a formal semantics. Two basic approaches characterize our
understanding of almost in the literature. Under scalar alternative accounts,
almost p holds when p is false but some close alternative proposition q is true.
Modal closeness accounts argue that almost p holds of world w when p is false
in w, but true in some close alternative world w′.
(1) a. scalar alternative:
J almost p K = λw. ¬p(w) & ∃q[ q ≈ALT p & q(w) ]
b. modal closeness:
J almost p K = λw. ¬p(w) & ∃w′[ w′≈w & p(w′) ]
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Despite their differences, these approaches both accept that the basic compo-
nents of almost are a polar condition (not p) and a proximal condition (close to
p). However, this two-part meaning has proven problematic, and most of the
literature on almost has sought to resolve these problems.
The polar condition causes trouble because the negation it contains behaves
in ways negation should not. The negation does not license NPIs, is immune to
evaluation, and often seems to express an implicature rather than an assertion.
The proximal condition also causes trouble, because almost does not always
require closeness, or at least closeness as we typically understand it. I almost
lived in San Francisco could be true even if you only considered it, but made no
steps to actually do it. Since it is also true if you nearly came to live there, the
sentence is ambiguous between a reading expressing an event’s actual prox-
imity to success and one expressing an event that would have been successful
given certain assumptions. This latter reading we call ‘almost at-a-distance’.
The at-a-distance reading can hold of any point in an accomplishment well be-
fore it culminates, not just the start or endpoint of the process: I almost climbed
Mount Everest, but I couldn’t raise the money.
To capture the at-a-distance reading and avoid the problems with polar con-
ditions, we argue that both scalar and modal approaches are incomplete and
actually complement each other. The meaning of almost must include a scalar
component and a distinct modal component. Almost applies if you are close to
success or if you are close to a point where you would have succeeded had noth-
ing else intervened. The meaning of almost contains an antecedent condition
(2a) that provides information for a modal condition (2b). Roughly put:
(2) J almost K(p)(w) = 1 iff
a. antecedent condition: There is a small enough set of propositions
required for p(w) that do not hold, and
b. modal condition: In all normal worlds where that set holds along
with what happened in w, and nothing else intervenes, p holds.
The modal condition applies trivially in the proximity reading, since as-
suming the antecedent condition’s small enough set of propositions would en-
tail truth of the proposition. Both proximity and at-a-distance readings are
special cases of the general meaning in (2), which we will refine.
The antecedent condition captures the polar condition without its prob-
lems by employing an existentially quantified statement that entails ¬p. The
modal condition relies on a non-interrupting ordering source, which is found
in modal progressives (Portner 1998). In section 3, we will discuss the an-
tecedent/modal orientation of almost in formal detail. In section 4 we explore
how the at-a-distance reading is blocked in cases where the modal continua-
tions cannot be completed. In section 5 we analyze the unavailability of at-a-
distance reading when almost is used with non-verbal complements. Finally,
in section 6, we show how our approach avoids pitfalls of the polar condition.
First, though, we will lay out the facts of almost that require both a scalar and
modal component.
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2 Scalar and modal approaches belong together
We begin this argument by demonstrating that the scalar and modal approaches
to almost complement each other. First we refine notions of scalar proximity to
distance ourselves from including scaled focus alternatives in the denotation
of almost in favor of a simple count of conditions that need to be met. Then,
we discuss the link between modal projection in cases where almost is true de-
spite a lack of proximity. We will see that uses of almost require closeness to
a point that entails full completion of the event, but such entailment cannot
occur reliably without modal restriction.
2.1 Refining scalar proximity
The scalar proximity approach was first offered by Hitzeman (1992), and has
been thoroughly refined since (Sevi 1998; Horn 2002; Penka 2006). Amaral &
Del Prete (2010) offer the most well-worked scalar account, based on Italian
quasi. In it, they argue for a quasi (3) that takes a focused proposition P as its
complement at LF, and asserts that P does not hold for the focused element α,
but does hold of P for some element β below α on a scale with α as an endpoint,
as long as β is close to α on the scale. The value of α, the scale’s endpoint, is
provided by the focused element (at 3pm), and the value of β is provided by
the event. In (3), quasi [almost] applies because there is an arrival by Leo (β)

















‘Leo arrived at almost 3 p.m.’






Figure 1: Scalar proximity to 3 pm
Amaral and del Prete’s account works well, but some uses of almost require
a refinement of the scalar approach. Sometimes almost can be felicitous even
when there is no clear idea of what the scale of alternatives should be, or how
they should be ordered. Penka (2006) suggests using Horn scales in such cases,
but these only apply when scalar environments are triggered by particular lex-
ical items like quantifiers or accomplishments. Nouwen (2006) finds examples
like (4) which lack those items and do not lead to the standard of proximity
required for such a scale.
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(4) Travis almost qualified for the long jump.
No matter which part of the VP is focused in (4), even the entire VP, the
scale will not consist of the focus alternatives to that constituent. Instead, we
can construe a scale of distances based on the circumstances provided by the
context. Assuming that a six-meter jump qualifies for the final, (4) is true if
Travis jumped 5m90, but not if he jumped 2 m or 6m50.
Amaral and del Prete do note these kinds of cases as well. They propose
that in contexts that do not generate Horn scales, speakers coerce a scalar inter-
pretation usually based on event structure rather than focus alternatives. In the
case of (4), the alternatives are simply the list of things that need to be done to
satisfy the predicate, combined and ranked in a way that leads to culmination:
Travis showed up, Travis made his run-up, Travis jumped without fouling, and
so forth. We can think of this set of propositions as a list of missing necessary
conditions.
However, we propose that the scalarity of almost does not require the con-
ditions to be ordered in any natural way (like temporal order). Instead we can
simply count them. Imagine that you wrote a poem of a particular form, like
a villanelle. The villanelle form imposes a lengthy list of strict criteria: 19 lines
long, containing 5 tercets and 1 quatrain. Meter is regular but not fixed. The
tercets have ABA rhyme scheme, the quatrain ABAA. There are two lines that
serve as refrains. One refrain must be the first line of the poem, the other the
third line. The second and fourth tercets must end with the first refrain; the
others end with the second. The last two lines of the poem must be the first
and second refrains, respectively.1
If you write a poem with all of these criteria, you have written a villanelle.
If you write a poem with all save one, you have almost written a villanelle.
It does not matter which criterion you failed, whether you changed a refrain2,
failed to keep a meter3, missed a rhyme4, or some combination of some of these.
Since the criteria are not ranked, there is no way to coerce a scale ranking the
propositions themselves.
As before, we could coerce different kinds of scales to use and measure
proximity. We could choose an ordered rank of sets of criteria starting with a
singleton, then a pair, a triple, and so forth, though that would still not reflect
the event structure. Instead, we could simply coerce a numerical scale of the
number of features required to make a villanelle. Either way, proximity to
success corresponds to a high enough proportion of sets or numerals (which
are mathematically ordered as sets); let us call this the proximity threshold.
The crucial idea is that when we measure proximity by counting the conditions
in this context, we do so with no regard to how the event unfolded. We are only







counting up ‘after the fact’. If the number of features met is lower than the full
set of required features, but higher than the proximity threshold, almost works.
What we ultimately suggest is that instead of requiring almost to associate
with focus and then forcing speakers to coerce scales when focus alternatives
do not provide the right ones, we can include scale selection independently
into the meaning of almost. Speakers always choose the conditions they are
measuring, and focus can significantly affect that choice (we discuss this more
in section 3.7). On this approach we capture proximity effects by measuring
on plain numerical scales, even when judging how the event unfolded. If the
event has 10 necessary conditions, and you complete 8, you’ve almost com-
pleted the action. If the complement of almost happens to order these condi-
tions into a natural scale through event structure or focus, almost will appear to
be based on that scale.
2.2 The need for modal projection
Refining a scalar account to merely count chosen missing conditions simplifies
matters of scalar proximity, and we will see that it does not sacrifice previous
findings. However, it still does not suffice, because almost can be felicitous
even if proximity is not met, no matter what kind of scale we try to use. Imag-
ine a baseball play where the batter hits the ball hard in such a way that he
runs safely to second base. This play is known as a “double.” Now, imagine
the next batter hits the ball in such a way that under most circumstances, he
would reach second base safely. However, in this instance, an infielder catches
the ball, making the batter “out.” About such a case, (5) expresses a true propo-
sition.
(5) The batter almost hit a double.
No scalar approach can capture this truth. A Horn scale introduced by dou-
ble would rank propositions expressing certain alternative baseball plays to a
double (Table 1). That will not work here: Both cases involving a ‘single’ are
false, ‘got out’ is true but too far away for the proximity threshold of almost,
and ‘strikeout’ is false.
proposition hit the ball reached 1st went for 2nd reached 2nd
The batter hit a double + + + +
The batter hit a single
but got put out at 2nd
+ + + –
The batter hit a single + + – –
The batter got out + – – –
The batter struck out – – – –
Table 1: Ranked alternatives to a double
We cannot construe a scale based on event structure that would lead to a
proximity reading, or even coerce a scale based on counting the proportion of
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met conditions, because out of all the things that needed to happen to make a
double, only a few actually happened. The batter must hit the ball. The ball
has to travel into the outfield, the outfielders have to be far enough to require
chasing the ball down, the batter has to stay on his feet running to second base,
he has to touch first base, reach second base, and not be tagged by a fielder
with the ball. Only one of these events occurred.
If we coerced a scale based on the things needed to be done to get a double
if the event had run its course, we would still end up with an out, because the
event did run its course. To even envisage an applicable scale of this sort, we
would have to suppose a continuation of the event without the fielder catching
the ball, along with no other impediments. We must suppose that the batter
doesn’t trip on the way to second base, that no other fielder catches the ball,
and that any other thing that could go wrong doesn’t. In essence, we only gain
proximity if we project counterfactually into the future from some point during
the actual event. We therefore need counterfactual reasoning to judge the truth
of almost at least some of the time.
Looking back, we can apply the same observation to our long jump case (4).
Imagine that Travis is the defending world champion and absolute favorite to
win. His qualification for the final requires a 6m00 jump, which for him is
a mere formality. On his turn he jumps a record 9m00, but oh no! His toe
was over the line and he fouled, scoring no distance at all. He finishes in last
place, but (4) is still true. If we employ a scale based on placement or scored
distance, almost should not be felicitous because Travis’s position is below any
proximity threshold proximal to qualification. Instead, conditional supposition
gets us the result: It is the fact that he fouled that matters. Essentially, (4) is true
because if he hadn’t fouled, he would have qualified, assuming nothing else
went wrong. Since nothing else did go wrong in this context, that assumption
is a safe one.
We will call such cases almost at-a-distance, or AAD. We can define AAD
as instances of almost whose proposition’s truth requires modal projection into
the future (from the event) in which nothing goes wrong that would prevent
the described event’s success. In such cases, the set of missing conditions is
large enough that no small-enough set of them can be assumed along with all
the conditions that did occur that will entail the prejacent’s truth in all worlds.
We can contrast these to a proximity reading of almost, where the small-enough
set is enough to entail the prejacent without requiring a modal.
2.3 Lowering the proximity threshold away from the endpoints
We have made the observation that almost can be felicitous even if the event is
not closer to culmination than some relevant proximity threshold. This obser-
vation was actually made long ago, but had always been resolved by simply
lowering the threshold. We will show that the modality of almost at-a-distance
is driving that lowering.
6
Morgan (1969) and McCawley (1972) found that almost could apply to events
that weren’t close to culmination, as in (6).5
Context:
John and Harry got into a fight. John had a gun in his pocket and
considered shooting Harry, but then cooler heads prevailed.
(6) John almost killed Harry.
Morgan and McCawley each preserved proximity to employ almost as evi-
dence towards a decomposition of events and verbal predicates into sub-events.
Specifically, McCawley proposed decomposing kill into act in a way to cause x
to become dead, where each decomposed predicate projects. Almost indicates a
proximity to the culmination of one of the sub-events, depending on its loca-
tion in the decomposed verb.
(7) a. John almost ( acted to cause Harry to become dead ) = (6)
b. John acted to almost ( cause Harry to become dead ) 6= (6)
c. John acted to cause Harry to become almost ( dead ) 6= (6)
However, (Dowty 1979: 242) demonstrates that the decomposition of pred-
icates like kill in this fashion is independently unfounded. Not to mention,
many predicates cannot be decomposed this way. Even with a more modern
approach to verbal decomposition, Rapp & von Stechow (1999) find no inter-
pretational effects of verb decomposition applying to German fast. Instead, its
interpretation depends on its placement with respect to an aspectual projec-
tion. Translating their modal approach to a scalar one for this discussion, the
placement of fast above aspect would put the event near the lower endpoint of
the scale, such that the event almost began to happen. They call this a coun-
terfactual reading (see Martin (2005) for similar facts about French). The place-
ment of fast below aspect gives the reading at the higher endpoint of the scale,
which is the proximity reading. This difference puts fast in line with scalar ac-
counts (like Hitzeman (1992)) that propose almost to be compatible with either
endpoint of a scale.
It is clear that almost can apply at either end of a scale, but we find that
almost at-a-distance allows almost to apply away from the endpoints. In (8),
describing a failed climb of Mount Everest, almost can apply felicitously at any
step along the way. The subject had to stop because of some impediment. No
matter which step the impediment occurs at, the sentence is felicitous, although
less and less so as we go down the list.
(8) I almost climbed Mount Everest, but . . .
a. I fell ill when I was 200m from the summit.
b. I had to turn around from the last base camp.
5We have added a context to this classic example.
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c. the weather turned bad halfway up.
d. base camp was inaccessible.
e. I couldn’t get into Nepal.
f. I couldn’t raise the money.
g. I decided not to get off the couch.
Like McCawley, our response to (8) is to lower the threshold for success
away from the endpoint. The success threshold (T ) is not the point provided by
the predicate P (or any complement of almost). Once this threshold (T ) drops
depending on the context, the proximity threshold β will drop along with it.





Q: false true false
Figure 2: Threshold drop
In (8d), the sentence is acceptable for cases where I almost made it to base
camp, if we can lower the threshold to a point where the proposition that I
almost made to base camp guarantees the proposition that I almost climbed
Mount Everest. The question now turns to the determination of the factors
permitting this threshold drop.
The only way to guarantee a successful threshold drop is if T entails P , but
T does not entail P by itself, because in some worlds something blocks you at
a later step. We need a modal whose domain limits the entailment worlds to
accessible ones where nothing blocks the rest of your climb.
The more that T drops away from P , the less likely that T will entail P , and
the less likely it is that almost will be acceptable. This was already apparent in
(8), but imagine now you’ve lost a basketball game and tell your friend:
(9) We almost won the game.
If we had lost the game 82-81 after missing a last-second shot, (9) is true. It is
obvious that in all accessible worlds where you make the shot you would have
won. However, as we get further away from a last-second shot, the strength
of almost weakens. For instance, it’s likely in (9b) that you would have won
if your star hadn’t gotten hurt, but it is not certain. A properly constructed
modal will be able to achieve this effect, by shrinking the set of worlds until
the implication holds in all of them.
∼(9) a. We lost 82-81, when I missed a last-second shot.
b. We lost 82-78, after our star player got hurt with 3 minutes left and
our team leading 78-76.
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c. We lost 82-70, and led with 7 minutes remaining, but failed to score
after that.
d. We lost 82-48, and didn’t even score in the first 10 minutes.
Returning to Morgan’s and McCawley’s example (6), we see that if John
thought about killing Harry but didn’t, that scenario requires a modal to re-
strict us to worlds where that thought forms part of a larger event whose
outcome is killing Harry. Those scenarios involve the at-a-distance reading.
The scenarios where the event actually nearly culminates involve the proxim-
ity reading and do not require a modal for truth.
2.4 Against mere modal proximity
We have argued that a modal is required for the meaning of almost, but modal
accounts are not new, either. The earliest one was offered by Sadock (1981) as
an attempt to derive the polar condition pragmatically. Almost p is true of w
if there is a close alternative world to w where p holds. The closeness relation
that comes with the modal provides the proximal condition with no further
assumption.
A more well-developed version was made by Rapp & von Stechow (1999),
who examine German fast (The relevant parts of their proposal apply in En-
glish). Their modal approach asserts the polar condition.
(10) J fast K = λpλw. p(w) = 0 & ∃w′[ close(w)(w′) & p(w′) = 1 ]
Our account will differ from theirs by showing that the closeness that comes
with this modal does not suffice for cases where almost only applies at a dis-
tance. We need additional aspects of modal meaning.
The notion of closeness in these modal approaches is standard. Two worlds
are identical if every proposition true of one is true of the other. Worlds differ
increasingly as they differ one proposition at a time. Rapp & von Stechow do
not work out this notion, but Nouwen (2006) does. Simplifying slightly, almost
compares two worlds based on the number of relevant propositions they share.
Two worlds are identical if they share all propositions. They are 1-removed if
one relevant proposition differs, 2-removed if two do, and so on. This sense
of modal closeness leads directly to relying on a numerical scale rather than
requiring ranked propositions. Almost p is true if and only if there is a world
w′ where p holds that is not too far removed from w.
Let’s see how this approach works with an example. In (11), we only need
to change two of the subject’s properties based on the contextually provided
scale. Thus, the closest world where p holds is 2-removed from the actual
world, so at least one world is only 2-removed. Proximity is determined sim-
ply, along the numerical scale of n-removal. In this case, let’s set 2-removal as
the threshold close enough for almost, so this use is felicitous.
Context:
To qualify for the final, Travis needs to jump 6m00. Instead, he
jumps 5m90, and fails to qualify.
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(11) Travis almost qualified for the long jump final.
w0 w1 w2 Property
F F T [ λxλw. x jumped 6m00 in w ](Travis)
F T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m95 in w ](Travis)
T T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m90 in w ](Travis)
0 1 2 : n-removal
Falsehood arises in (12), where four propositions must change on the con-
textually provided scale for the event to succeed. The closest world where p
holds is 4-removed from the actual world, so no world is only 2-removed, and
almost fails.
Context:
To qualify for the final, Travis needs to jump 6m00. Instead, he
jumps 5m80, and fails to qualify.
(12) Travis almost qualified for the long jump final.
w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 Property
F F F F T [ λxλw. x jumped 6m00 in w ](Travis)
F F F T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m95 in w ](Travis)
F F T T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m90 in w ](Travis)
F T T T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m85 in w ](Travis)
T T T T T [ λxλw. x jumped 5m80 in w ](Travis)
0 1 2 3 4 : n-removal
In essence, Nouwen’s n-removal is a scalar approach where all the scales
rank counts of comparisons between possible worlds rather than counts of
propositions themselves. However, despite its use of a modal, it does not apply
to almost at-a-distance. As we saw, almost at-a-distance corresponds to drop-
ping the threshold away from the endpoint of the scale, and that this drop
relies on entailment. The result of entailment in a possible world semantics
leads to an unwelcome result.
Consider the case of climbing Everest below (14), where you fail to en-
ter Nepal. Given the propositions listed, the nearest success world is w5, 5-
removed from the actual world, making it too far for the proximity reading if
the threshold is 2-removal.
(13) I almost climbed Mount Everest, but I couldn’t enter Nepal.
w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 proposition
F F F F F T [ λxλw. x reached the summit in w ](I)
F F F F T T [ λxλw. x reached the last base camp in w ](I)
F F F T T T [ λxλw. x reached halfway up in w ](I)
F F T T T T [ λxλw. x reached base camp in w ](I)
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x entered Nepal in w ](I)
T T T T T T [ λxλw. x raised the money in w ](I)
0 1 2 3 4 5 : n-removal
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On an at-a-distance reading, entering Nepal would have led to climbing
Mount Everest. We’ve seen that this requires entailment, so any world where
you enter Nepal is one where you climb Mount Everest. In that case, the nearest
success world becomes w1 in our example. Unfortunately, due to the entailed
propositions, w1 is now 5-removed from w0, pushing it beyond the threshold.
Almost should always fail here.
(14) I almost climbed Mount Everest, but I couldn’t enter Nepal.
w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 proposition
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x reached the summit in w ](I)
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x reached the last base camp in w ](I)
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x reached halfway up in w ](I)
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x reached base camp in w ](I)
F T T T T T [ λxλw. x entered Nepal in w ](I)
T T T T T T [ λxλw. x raised the money in w ](I)
0 5 5 5 5 5 : n-removal
Using modality to capture proximity seamlessly incorporates the link between
entailment and threshold drop, but falters because it doesn’t bring successful
worlds closer to the threshold in terms of n-removal. As we have already seen,
the entailment is not guaranteed. The set of worlds where one reaches the
summit must be a subset of the worlds where one reaches the highest base
camp. Therefore, without removing worlds where the continuation fails, this
version of threshold drop will take us further away from the actual world, and
almost should fail. Consequently, we must independently limit the worlds at
issue to ones where the entailment does hold. Even with a modal-closeness
approach, an independent modality is required for the drop to occur.
3 A new orientation for almost
We have shown that in some cases, the interpretation of almost requires both a
scalar and a modal component. We will propose a formal means of combining
these components that ensures that both apply in all cases. When proximity
holds, the modal will apply in a harmlessly superfluous fashion. When it fails,
the modal is required for almost to hold at-a-distance.
Our denotation offers a new orientation for the meaning of almost. Rather
than polar and proximal conditions, we employ an antecedent condition and
a modal condition. The antecedent condition asserts that a small enough sub-
set of necessary conditions for p do not hold. This entails the polar condi-
tion and contains a proximity measure. The modal condition asserts that if
we assume that subset along with relevant parts of what did happen (a cir-
cumstantial modal base), and if we continue normally with no impediments (a
non-interrupting ordering source), p holds.
We give a formal expression of this denotation in (15), mixing set and func-
tion notations for exposition. This denotation is cross-categorial, and it reflects
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the notion that almost only fails to hold when both proximal and at-a-distance
readings fail.
(15) Given a world w, an expression φ(α),
Let NEC(φ(α))(w) be a set of propositions necessary for φ(α) to hold of
w.
J almost K(φ)(α)(w) = 1 iff : ∃Z
[
( Z ⊆SE NEC(φ(α))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→w′ ∈ φ(α) ])
]
a. There is a small enough subset Z of NEC(φ(α))(w),
b. such that no proposition of Z holds of w, and
c. in all the best ordered worlds w′ according to a non-interrupting
ordering source
d. such that the selected circumstances of w hold in w′ along with Z,
e. φ(α) holds of w′
The examples we’ve seen have been what we can call ‘verbal’ almost, and
we can start our analysis with these. Verbal almost describes an adverbial
placed fairly high in the verbal spine. It out-scopes a progressive, as the fol-
lowing difference shows.
(16) Imogen was almost crossing the street, when a bus hit her.
a. X ALM > PROG : It is almost the case that in all worlds where the
event continues without impediment, Imogen crossed the street
b. # PROG > ALM : In all worlds where the event continues without
impediment, Imogen almost crossed the street.
Assuming that tense auxiliaries in English are placed at T◦, the placement
of almost after the auxiliary verb was in the structure shows that it is placed
below T◦, which introduces tense. This structure places verbal almost above
aspect but below tense, which we take as pronominal of type i (Kratzer 1998).
This means that both sister and mother nodes to verbal almost will be of type





J T◦ K : i 〈i, wt〉
J almost K :





3.1 The proximity reading
Before showing how almost-at-a-distance works, we examine almost with a prox-
imity reading, defined as one where modal projection is not required for almost
to be felicitous. If I accomplished most of the steps required for climbing Mount
Everest in a world w at time t1, it is true that I almost climbed Mount Everest
at t1 in w. In this case, the property argument of almost is the AspP denoting
the set of time-world pairs in which there is an event of me climbing Mount
Everest. In the denotation of almost, J AspP K corresponds to the first argument




J almost K AspP
λtλw. ∃e[ τ(e) ⊆ t & [I climbed M.E.](e)(w) ]
(J(18)K) = λw. ∃Z
[
(Z ⊆SE NEC(J AspP K(t1))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→w′ ∈ J AspP K(t1) ])
]
Given this, we can define NEC to take two arguments, in this case a propo-
sition and a world, so that NEC(CME(t1))(w) returns a set of conditions neces-
sary for w ∈ CME(t1) (19). This set can vary for many reasons which we will
discuss, but for now let us assume that it contains seven steps. The end of the
modal condition (w′ ∈ J AspP K(t1)) indicates that these steps must occur within
the topic time.
(19) I almost climbed Mount Everest at t1 (but I had to turn back halfway up)
a. Let CME = J AspP K in (18)
b. NEC(CME(t1))(w) = { A, B, C, D, E, F, G }
XA = λw. I decide to climb Mount Everest at t1 in w
XB = λw. I raise the funds at t1 in w
XC = λw. I arrive in Nepal at t1 in w
XD = λw. I make it to base camp at t1 in w
XE = λw. I make it halfway up at t1 in w
F = λw. I reach the Hillary Step at t1 in w
G = λw. I reach the summit at t1 in w
NEC(CME(t1))(w) contains seven propositions. Of these, only the members
of { A, B, C, D, E } hold of w at t1 in (19). The other steps are the missing
conditions. The sets of missing conditions are { F }, { G }, { F, G }.
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If almost is felicitous, one of these sets must be “small enough,” and can be
assumed along with the met conditions to entail p of w at t1 in all the right
modal worlds. In the simplest case, that set is { F, G }, whose assumption
entails p in all worlds, because it completes the set of missing conditions. We
can assume the modal’s presence to maintain a single denotation, but it has no
effect here.
Determining that this set is small enough requires a scalar component, which
we now lay out. Earlier we saw that proximity with almost can rely on a simple
numeric scale of propositions met. Proximity can thus be measured with Jac-
card dissimilarity, which indicates proportionally how few members two sets
share. Disjoint sets have a dissimilarity value of 1; identical sets 0.
(20) Jaccard dissimilarity (dJ )
Given sets A,B: dJ(A,B) = 1− |A∩B||A∪B|
Whenever A ⊆ B: dJ(A,B) = 1− |A||B|
A set of missing conditions Z is a subset of some set of necessary conditions
NEC(p(t))(w), so the two sets’ Jaccard dissimilarity (dJ (Z, NEC(p(t))(w))) will
correspond inversely to Z’s size relative to the superset. As Z gets smaller, its
dissimilarity to NEC(p(t))(w) rises toward one. The truth-conditions of almost
require the dissimilarity of Z to NEC(p(t))(w) to be closer to 1 than some par-
ticular threshold value T. This value is not easy to determine, and may not be
completely fixed. We will not attempt a precise formulation of the exact num-
ber T should be, but it seems to typically fall between .7 and .8.6
(21) Small enough subset
A is a small enough subset of B (A ⊆SE B) if and only if:
a. A ⊆ B and
b. dJ(A,B) ≥ T, where
c. T is a contextually selected value such that .7 ≤ T ≤ .8
Returning to (19) we see that { F, G } has a Jaccard dissimilarity of 27 = .714
with respect to the set of necessary conditions. This value exceeds T, so the
two-member set is small enough.
(22) dJ (Z, NEC(p(t1))(w)) = 1− |{F, G}||{A, B, C, D, E, F, G}| = 1−
2
7 = .714
Any world where the small-enough set { F, G } holds along with { A, B, C,
D, E }will be a world where p holds of w at t1, since all of NEC(p(t1))(w) holds.
Almost is felicitous. The modal becomes superfluous, because the modal base
worlds will all entail p.
6Our setting of T between .7 and .8 is crude and warrants its own investigation. For now it will
suffice because the exact value is not a crucial component of our analysis. The inexactitude of T is
reflected in judgments of almost. Also, the proportion will depend on the chosen set of necessary
conditions. T seems to increase along with the cardinality of NEC(p(t))(w); for instance, 8 out of 10
allows almost more easily than 800 out of 1000 does, and so on.
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3.2 The at-a-distance reading
We have defined almost-at-a-distance as occurring when the proximity reading
fails, but almost works due to a modal projecting into the future from the event.
In the formal terms just laid out, AAD occurs when the Jaccard similarity is
lower than the requisite threshold, but the small-enough set brings us to a point
where the entailment occurs, subject to modal restriction.
This modal employs a circumstantial modal base, which assumes certain
facts about the world that are selected by the speaker (Abusch 2012). When
the event is close to culmination (19), a small-enough set of missing conditions
entails p. In a case like (23), though, given the same set of necessary conditions,
there is no small-enough set that entails p. Only one of the seven conditions
(A) is met.
(23) I almost climbed Mount Everest (in w at t1) (but I couldn’t raise the money)
a. NEC(CME(t1))(w) = { A, B, C, D, E, F, G }
XA = λw. I decide to climb Mount Everest in w at t1
B = λw. I raise the funds in w at t1
C = λw. I arrive in Nepal in w at t1
D = λw. I make it to base camp in w at t1
E = λw. I make it halfway up in w at t1
F = λw. I reach the Hillary Step in w at t1
G = λw. I reach the summit in w at t1
As before, small-enough subsets will have no more than two members.
Added to {A}, none of these sets entail p in all worlds— { A, B, C }, { A, C,
D } etc. Instead, the modal projects into the future from { A, B, C } until the
other conditions are met. Those conditions are not met in all possible worlds,
so for truth, the modal will need to restrict the interpretation to worlds where
the entailment does hold.
A circumstantial modal base selects relevant facts that hold in the evalua-
tion world, and enter the modal assumption in modal worlds. We employ a
modal base function circ that takes an evaluation world w and returns the set
of relevant circumstances of w. In a case like climbing Mount Everest, those
are the necessary conditions that the event has actually met, the nature of the
mountain, the weather, and so forth.
(24) circ(w) ⊆ { λw. Mt. Everest exists at t1 in w, λw. I decided to climb
Mount Everest at t1 in w. . .}
The modal base is modified by assuming a small-enough subset Z of missing
conditions, giving us the intersection of Z the set given by circ. That intersec-
tion is provided to almost by the relation R, which takes sets of propositions
and returns the set of worlds where the largest consistent subset of their inter-
section holds (Kratzer 2012).
15
(25) R(circ(w),Z) =
{w′ | ∀p[ p is in the largest consistent subset of circ(w) ∩ Z→w′∈ p] }
For the example, let’s make Z the small-enough set { B, C }. This relation mod-
ifies the modal base into R(circ(w),Z), which is a subset of
⋂
{ A, B, C }.
The worlds selected by the modified modal base are sorted by a non-inter-
rupting (NI) ordering source, which Portner (1998, 2009) lays out to solve the
progressive paradox: A progressive-marked event does not necessarily end
as a complete event fitting the description (26). Instead, the progressive indi-
cates that if nothing ordinary intervenes, given the state of things at the topic
time/reference time, the event would later finish.
(26) Jeanne was crossing the street (at t) when she got hit by a bus
6⇒ There is an event of Jeanne crossing the street at t
= There is an event throughout t such that had it continued without
interruption, it would be an event of Jeanne crossing the street that ends
after t
Portner improves upon previous modal analyses with a function BestNI, which
applies a non-interrupting ordering source to the modal base and selects the
best normal worlds where the event continues uninterrupted.7 An NI ordering
source contains propositions that describe normal situations that could inter-
vene. If Jeanne is crossing the street, those propositions might include that
Jeanne doesn’t trip, that Jeanne doesn’t change direction, that the oncoming
bus stops, and so on. In worlds where these propositions hold, the event is
completed.
We saw that to use almost at-a-distance, we had to project counterfactually
into the future from the event and assume that everything worked out. In (5),
where a baseball player almost hit a double, we assumed a list of things that
had to not happen in order for the double to be completed— the fielders had
to be far enough from the ball, the runner had to stay on his feet, and so forth.
In our mountain-climbing scenario, the modal base returns worlds where the
speaker raises the funds and reaches Nepal (propositions A and B). In the actual
world, when somebody accomplishes those things, they normally succeed in
climbing the mountain if nothing else intervenes– they don’t fall ill, they don’t
get injured, the weather doesn’t stop them, and so on. The ordering source
reflects this normal outcome, containing propositions where no problems im-
pede progress.
Formally, BestNI takes a set of worlds and applies the ordering source NI,
which is a set of propositions of a negative character, since they describe events
not taking place— the weather doesn’t turn bad, nobody gets hurt, and so on.
BestNI returns the subset of the modal worlds where the most non-interruptions
occur.8
7Portner assumes that there always is a best-ranked object, and we adopt that assumption.
8We follow Portner in assuming that there always is such a subset.
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(27) Ordering: Given two worlds w′, w′′, and the set of propositions NI,
w′≤NI w′′ iff the set of propositions in NI that hold of w′ is a superset
of those that hold of w′′.
(28) BestNI(R(circ(w),Z)) =
{w′ ∈ R(circ(w),Z) | ¬∃w′′[ w′′∈ R(circ(w),Z) & w′′ <NI w′ ] }
Applied to (25), that gives us the set of worlds where all the necessary con-
ditions hold, giving us the entailment that renders almost felicitous. Essentially,
there is a small enough set of missing conditions such that in all the best non-







{A, B, C, D, E, F, G}
3.3 The role of normality
Put simply, the meaning of almost involves a scalar component counting miss-
ing necessary conditions, and a modal component that involves the same or-
dering source seen in the progressive. The at-a-distance reading of almost re-
quires the modal component in order to be true, so we can predict that this
reading is unavailable in contexts where the progressive fails due to the order-
ing source.
One such context occurs when all successful continuations require non-
normal worlds. The non-interrupting ordering source’s involvement of nor-
mal worlds derives the role that normal outcomes play in the progressive and
in almost. In (30a), the progressive is false even if Mary had killed a few Roman
soldiers, because even in the best uninterrupted normal outcomes, she will not
defeat an army single-handedly. If the scenario continues and she is then killed
(30b), the use of almost-at-a-distance (AAD) is false, for the same reasons.
(30) Mary fought an entire Roman army by herself, and started off strong,
slaying three soldiers. This only left 9,997 in front of her. . .
a. progressive: #Mary was wiping out the Roman army.
. . . who promptly slew her.
b. AAD: #Mary almost wiped out the Roman army.
The steps required to wipe out the army are in NEC, and the circumstances
include the weaponry she is using, her physical condition, the three slayings
she has managed, any help she might have, the Romans’ physical conditions,
the terrain, and so forth. Assuming these, and the three slain Romans, even the
best normal outcomes will not lead to her victory.
Changing these circumstances can make the proposition true. If Mary had
a nuclear weapon in her arsenal, and launched it towards the massed army,
(30a) is true with the progressive even if she had slain zero soldiers so far,
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because success would normally ensue from an uninterrupted continuation
given the new circumstances– the weaponry she is using has changed, but her
physical condition, any help she might have, the Romans’ physical conditions,
the terrain, and the rest could be the same. Were she about to decide to launch
a warhead before being dissuaded, AAD becomes true in (30b) for the same
reason. Portner (1998) points out that the notion of normal outcomes relies on
judging probability. Judging probability generally suits a premise semantics
well, even with complex combinations of ordering sources (Katz et al. 2012).9
3.4 Context dependency in circumstances
The use of a circumstantial modal opens at-a-distance readings of almost up to
certain types of context dependency that appear in the use of premise sets.
As Abusch (2012) points out, a circumstantial modal also allows speakers
to select different sets of relevant facts, leading to another kind of ambiguity.
She gives an example of a tree falling away from a house due to a windstorm.
An inspection finds that the tree was rotting on the side nearer the house, and
had it fallen on its own would have landed right on the home office. The occu-
pant of the office says ”I could have been killed,” based on the circumstances
including the rot, while the other household member says “No you couldn’t
have,” based on the circumstances including the wind direction during the
storm. Both are true, so if the two people start arguing, it’s really over whose
selected circumstances are more relevant or important.
We expect to see a similar effect on truth from choosing circumstances with
almost, and we do. The facts of the world will shape the truth of almost, by
forging the modal’s strength. If you say I almost climbed Mount Everest, but I
decided to stay home, whether that’s true will depend on independent facts that
make the entailment come through. Some facts make almost stronger, while
others make it weaker. It is much more believable if this sentence is uttered
by a seasoned alpinist than by a bon-vivant semanticist, because the alpinist’s
condition and experience make it far more likely that taking the step of decid-
ing to do it will lead to actually doing it. Likewise, it is far more believable if
the semanticist uttered I almost wrote a squib about weak definites, but decided to
watch TV than it is for the alpinist, for similar reasons. In these cases, the scales
of necessary conditions are identical, but the circumstances that are applied to
the modal can vary, so the differences emerge in the modal component.
3.5 Context dependency in necessary conditions
The set of necessary conditions is also context-dependent. A subset of them is
added to the modal base by the modal condition, so determining these condi-
9Lassiter (2011) offers an alternate approach to probability in modals that relies on numerical
values. This might work very well with almost, but it would require more investigation to see
how it can combine with sets of missing conditions. Generally, we expect that more detailed looks
targeting the modal condition will find even more subtleties in the use of almost at-a-distance.
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tions contributes to the modal premises. This in turn leads us to predict effects
from their selection.
Another Abusch example involves a sports team nearly making the playoffs
under one circumstantial modal base, but not another. New York could have made
the playoffs might be true if you look at the standings mathematically but false if
you consider how the season unfolded. Changing the counterfactual to almost
triggers the same effect.
Imagine a sports team from New York that failed to qualify for the play-
offs, which required a third-place finish or better. They finished fourth, but
were actually eliminated halfway through the season before a miraculous run
of victories. So they had no real chance of making the playoffs. The proposition
in (31) would be true if we are measuring the distance to third place, because
they finished fourth.
(31) New York almost qualified for the playoffs.
The chosen necessary conditions are the easily-scalable places in the standings
at the end of the season. Most of those are true in this context, so there is a
small-enough set whose assumption will get you the rest. The modal is unnec-
essary for almost to be true, so this is a proximity reading.
On the other hand, if we are considering how the season unfolded, the set of
necessary conditions becomes the things needed to be done in order to qualify.
Since the team was eliminated, some of these were left unmet. Even if most
were met by the end of the season– bringing them up to 4th place– by the time
they were eliminated, no normal worlds remained whose continuation would
see them qualify. Just for the sake of the example, let’s say they ultimately
needed to win 50 games out of 80. Make the numerical scale of victories the set
of necessary conditions. The team started by winning only 9 out of their first
40 games, making it impossible to reach 50 by mid-season. They then win all
40 after that, ending with 49 wins. They did not almost qualify.10
To be fair, they wouldn’t have known they needed 50 until later in the sea-
son, but looking back as we say (31), we do. Still, if we select a point earlier in
the season, the effect still applies. Imagine they had won their first two games,
and modally project from there. Clearly this is false on the proximity read-
ing, since 2 is not close to 50. They were not mathematically eliminated at the
time, but had not achieved very many missing conditions. For the at-a-distance
reading to apply, there has to be a small enough set that would get them with
normal continuations to 50. Given the nature of the team, the odds were not
good, just like they weren’t when Mary wasn’t wiping out the Roman army
(30). If we modally project from points further along in the season, the odds
grow worse and worse until elimination. So, if we choose the at-a-distance
reading for almost in this context, the proposition is false.
(31) New York almost qualified for the playoffs.
10Let us reiterate the point about choosing different necessary conditions: Imagine that twenty
years later, a kid reads the standings but has no knowledge of the season. The child would think
that New York almost made the playoffs that year.
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proximity TRUE because fourth is close enough to third
AAD FALSE because even the best normal outcomes based on any set
of circumstances would lead to a failure to qualify.
Speakers can even deny the truth of these claims based on which set of
conditions they choose.
(32) A: (looks at standings) New York almost qualified for the playoffs!
B: No, they didn’t! They were eliminated so early I quit watching by
the end of the season.
Crucially, the fact of elimination does not necessarily rule out the AAD
reading by itself. It depends on the circumstances. Let’s say they had led the
league 3/4 of the way through and were cruising until their star player broke a
leg. Then they tumbled to seventh, being eliminated along the way. We could
make (31) true if we modally project from the point before the leg-break. There
is a lot of variability in the truth of almost at-a-distance, even more so than with
proximity readings. However, this variability is just the kind we see in other
aspects of modality, and we can see how the pieces of the meaning of almost
contribute to this variability.
3.6 Constraints on necessary conditions
The use of premise sets gives the meaning of almost contextual flexibility ex-
actly when we observe speakers being flexible. However, it also opens up the
question of what might possibly limit them. For instance, nothing in our pro-
posal prevents speakers from concocting sets of necessary conditions with only
two members in order to guarantee proximity. However, we do not observe
that behavior, suggesting that something prevents it. That said, the precise na-
ture of the selection of necessary conditions extends past the boundaries of this
paper, and likely resides outside the semantics. It hardly seems proper to work
all these facts into the semantics of almost, or any lexical item. For now, we
sketch some observed constraints on necessary conditions, while leaving their
explanation to cognitive science.
(33) Constraints on sets of necessary conditions
a. Each step must be ‘equivalent’ in size.
This is more obvious on a numeric scale— if the scale is from 1 to 20,
each integer in between is on the scale. We cannot say that 12 is al-
most 20 by lumping numbers 13 to 20. Likewise, you can’t package
together some of the largest steps of an accomplishment together.
Obviously these steps needn’t be perfectly equivalent the way inte-
gers are, but there is a constraint against convenient packaging.
b. Each step must be independently represented.
Even if you packaged propositions A and B together to make A ∩
B, at least A would still be in the set, leaving you with as many
propositions as you would have had anyways (cp. Kratzer (1977)).
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c. Scales must be relatively coarse
Penka (2006) observes that almost works with round numbers (al-
most 100) but not with exact ones (?almost 102), because almost re-
quires a coarse-grained scale. However, coarseness is relative. A
thermometer can read ‘almost 102 degrees’ if the scale involves frac-
tions of degrees.
The constraint on size ‘equivalence’ is not so simple, because some steps are
significantly more important than others. Yet, close consideration shows that
this disparity does not obviate the constraint. To illustrate this, let’s turn back
to sport. In order to change a rule of association football (soccer), six of the
eight votes of the International Football Association Board must approve. The
football associations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland each
have one vote, while FIFA, which otherwise governs the sport worldwide, has
four votes. Whether a rule change almost passes depends on unequal power,
but the semantics of almost neutralizes this inequality.
(34) Scenario 1: England proposes a rule allowing teams to field 12 players.
Scotland votes aye, but the others hate it, so the measure fails 6-2.
In (34), it is false that the measure almost passed. Focusing on the tally
resulting from the vote, the necessary conditions are the propositions that 1
vote was in favor, that 2 votes were in favor, and so on. In that case, only 2 of
the 6 required conditions are met, and that is not close enough. Even though
FIFA’s four votes are lumped together, they count individually towards the
total based on constraint b (33b), and the way the vote unfolds has no effect on
that count.
Now, let’s refine the scenario to allow almost at-a-distance.
(35) Scenario 2: England proposes a rule allowing teams to field 12 players
instead of 11. Scotland hedges, Wales and Northern Ireland are dead-
set against it. FIFA considers it after long debate. Scotland declares
they will vote whichever way FIFA does. FIFA takes more time, nearly
accepts it, but ultimately declines. The measure fails 7-1.
Fewer votes approved than in Scenario 1, so The measure almost passed is
false on a proximity reading where the necessary conditions are the number of
votes. The AAD reading is false with these conditions as well, and the false-
hood of both readings makes the proposition false.
On the other hand, if we select necessary conditions that are the steps of
the event as it unfolded, the a different result emerges. In that case we can
select five conditions: The introduction of the measure (I), the debate (D), the
proposition that FIFA votes in favor (F), and the propositions that England (E)
and Scotland (S) approve.
(36) {I, D, F, E, S}
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In actuality, only three of them hold (I, D and E). Four steps are required,
though, so a small-enough set of missing conditions is a singleton. The set {I,
D, E} is not close enough for the proximity reading. In relevant modal worlds
though, assuming the singleton set {F} means that S holds with it, making {I,
D, F, E, S} hold, and entailing that the measure passes. There is thus a small-
enough set that fits the description for almost to hold.
This scenario highlights that even when the parts of the event are not equal,
that inequality is neutralized. Either the measuring of the event’s result breaks
its strength into a number of equal parts, or the event structure treats each part
as a single step of the event, allowing almost at-a-distance to work. So (35)
would also be true had Scotland debated, and FIFA agreed to vote whichever
way Scotland did. Speakers are able to choose different sets of necessary condi-
tions, just like they are able to choose different sets of circumstances in modals.
Also, disputes can arise if speakers dispute whose set of necessary conditions
ought to be at issue. In this IFAB case, one person might insist on the conditions
that only counts the votes, and based on that choice, dispute that the measure
almost passed.
3.7 Focus and necessary conditions
One other issue concerning necessary conditions is focus. Focus features promi-
nently in some approaches that make almost focus-sensitive (Penka 2006; Ama-
ral & Del Prete 2010; Kilbourn-Ceron 2017). A part of the focused constituent
provides the scale’s endpoint, and the scalar alternatives are based on the set
of focus alternatives.
(37) Terese almost arrived [ at 3 pm. ]F
ALT = { at 2:59, at 2:58, etc. . . }
However, we find that while focus might be important in many cases, it is not
a requirement that should be included in the denotation of almost.
Almost does not always have a focused constituent in its complement (38),
in English or Italian.11 In fact, almost itself can be the focused constituent (39).
In (38) and (39), the endpoint of the scale is provided by the complement of
almost/quasi, not what is focused.
(38) a. [ Terese ]F almost broke the record.
b. [ Teresa ]F ha quasi battuto il record.
6→ Someone close to Terese on a scale broke the record
(39) a. Terese [ almost ]F broke the record.
b. Teresa ha [ quasi ]F battuto il record.
6→ The extent to which Terese broke the record is not ’almost’, but
close to it.
11We thank several Italian speakers for their judgments.
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Of course, focus is more complex than just attaching narrowly to a pro-
sodically-marked constituent. Even so, we find that focus is not crucially linked
to almost. Kilbourn-Ceron (2017) suggests that the complement of almost, which
she calls its ‘associate’ at LF, is focused and provides the alternatives for the
scale of proximity. However, the scalar alternatives are not always the focus
alternatives. In (40), the VP’s focus alternatives involves marrying Chris, mar-
rying Pat, and so on. But the scale that almost/quasi is building cannot involve
those alternatives. Instead, it contains steps toward marrying Sam.
(40) Terese almost [ married SAM ]F
Teresa ha quasi [ sposato SAM ]F
At best, we can say that the almost bases its scale, or in our approach its nec-
essary conditions, off of the (largest) VP containing the focused constituent.
However, that does not really gain us anything more than our proposal that
almost takes them from its entire complement, especially once we consider the
context effects we have seen.
Since focus does not necessarily provide the necessary conditions for al-
most, we do not include it in its meaning. Focus effects are common and often
predictable, but we propose that these effects on NEC arise from the nature of
the events themselves, rather than the meaning of almost. For instance, the na-
ture of arrival events is such that the subject has to reach a particular location
at a particular time, and that the parts of the event are each homomorphically
mapped to some location or time. Since time is scalar, that location mapping
is, too. If focus targets the location or the time, we can naturally evoke a scale
that speakers easily adopt as necessary conditions. If focus targets something
besides the location or time, that effect can dissipate, especially if the focused
constituent is outside the scope of almost. Ultimately, we do not rule out a role
for focus in the interpretation of almost, but we do not have convincing reasons
to include it in its denotation.
In this section, we have shown how a single denotation of almost with an
antecedent condition and a modal condition applies in proximity and at-a-
distance readings. We also demonstrate that modal uses of almost exhibit the
same kinds of contextual variability that pieces of modality trigger in the pro-
gressive and in counterfactuals with circumstantial modal bases. We discuss
limits on necessary conditions and effects arising from the choice of necessary
conditions, possible limits on them, and a more nuanced role for focus in their
selection.
4 Systematic blocking of the at-a-distance reading
We have defined almost at-a-distance (AAD) as instances of almost where the
following hold:
• The proposition containing almost is only true due to a modal projection
from the parts of the event that satisfy necessary conditions.
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• In this modal projection nothing out of the ordinary goes wrong that
would prevent the described event’s success within the topic time.
The use of almost only leads to falsehood if both readings fail. When almost
p is true without requiring any modal projection, we call this the proximity
reading.
The way the denotation of almost is presented (15), the final part of the
modal condition ensures that the prejacent must come true by the end of the
topic time. Consequently, AAD can be blocked if the topic time interval is too
short for the modal continuation to come true. This section discusses several
contexts that routinely block AAD in this way.
4.1 Events with short times left
If the topic time does not provide room for completion, AAD will not apply.
The predicate will not follow from any normal uninterrupted outcome of the
premises, much less all of them.
Context:
You, a semanticist, had a good idea for a paper, and thought, “Maybe
I’ll submit an abstract to SALT.” You decide to send one in and
check the call for papers, but it turns out the deadline is today–
in about an hour. So you decide not to.
(41) #I almost sent an abstract to SALT at t2
This proposition is false because neither proximity nor distance readings hold.
The lack of proximity reading is obvious, but the distance reading is blocked
by the small topic time. If proposition A is the decision to send an abstract, and
B through G are the other steps, something like Figure 3 is the result. In nor-
mal worlds you will not have time to finish within the topic time interval (the
rectangle), even without interruption, and even if you would have normally
finished given enough time.
— Figure 3 is to be placed here —
NEC(p(t2))(w): A B C D E F G
t2
circ(w) Z
Figure 3: Unfolding of the event past the topic time
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4.2 The progressive
The lack of room to develop also explains why AAD fails with a progressive
aspect complement. In (42), almost can indicate a state of Tom moving at a
near run, or the near-beginning of a state of running to the store; both cases are
proximity readings.
(42) Tom was almost running to the store.
a. Tom was jogging/walking quickly to the store
b. Tom was about to run to the store
We cannot get an at-a-distance reading. For instance, that he was still but had
he started moving he would have eventually been running. We also cannot use
(42) to mean that he was running most of the way to the store.
(43) a. # Tom was loping, but had he sped up, he would have wound up
running
b. # Tom was running most of the way to the store (even with focus on
to the store).
The progressive is an interesting case because it involves a modal by the
same ordering source we propose for almost. Portner (1998) proposes a Kratze-
rian update to modal accounts of the progressive by which there is an event
that fills the topic time, such that in the best non-interrupted continuation
worlds, there is a temporal extension of the topic time where the event is suc-






Tom run to the store
(45) J AspP K = λtλw. ∃e
[
e ≤w & τ(e) = t & ∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(circ(e))→
∃t′[ t ⊆NF t′& Tom ran to the store in t′ at w′] ]
]
Tom was running to the store is true for time t if there is an event throughout
t that when normally extended, is an event of Tom running to the store. Given
this, the incompatibility with almost at-a-distance becomes evident. Almost re-
quires the described event to come true during the topic time in the modal
worlds, because it states that there are missing conditions in the actual world.
Notably, the described event is not the completed event (the entire run to the
store), but the part of the event that the progressive takes onward (the slice of
running to the store). However, the progressive itself requires that slice to be
holding throughout the topic time. The state of affairs changes after the topic
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time, not during it. We therefore end up with an event that does not change
during topic time, while AAD requires change during the topic time. AAD is
not licensed.
The nature of the event does not rule out a proximity reading, so long as the
event is not changing during the topic time. In this case, the modal in almost is
superfluous, and does not interact with the modal of the progressive. Readings
allowed with almost+progressive include those where there is an ongoing event
whose description is almost the description used, as we saw in (42). We can say
that Tom is almost running to the store if he is moving to the store at a near-run.
4.3 Present-tense statives
Another notable environment where at-a-distance readings are unavailable oc-
curs with present-tense clauses with stative predicates. For instance, take (46),
about the US state of Oklahoma. The proposition expressed here is false on the
most salient proximity reading, because nothing of that sort is envisaged.12
(46) Oklahoma is almost two states.
It is also false on the at-a-distance reading, even though the facts of the
world seem to support it. With the distance reading, (46) would be true if a
small-enough set of conditions had occurred that, given a normal continuation,
it would be split today. Such a scenario actually happened in 1905, when a con-
vention proposed splitting the Oklahoma Territory into two future states, Okla-
homa and Sequoyah. The Sequoyah group wrote a constitution and petitioned
Congress for statehood. Congress declined, but had they simply agreed, then
what is now Oklahoma would probably be two states. However, the modal
condition requires the change to take place during the topic time, which is the
present, and that is not the case.
The limiting effect of the topic time holds even when the proximity reading
is true. In (47), the proximity reading is obvious— you live near San Francisco
at the utterance time.
(47) I almost live in San Francisco.
But the at-a-distance reading is unavailable, for instance if the speaker was
offered a job last year in Palo Alto with housing on site just a few miles from S.F.
but declined it and stayed put thousands of kilometers away. Even if it’s true
that had the speaker accepted they would currently live near San Francisco,
(47) is false on the at-a-distance reading.
The reason AAD is blocked here is simply that the modal condition restricts
the continuation to the topic time, which is the present. The meaning of (47) is
given in (48), with the topic time t0 denoting the utterance time.
(48) a. p(t0) = λw. I live in SF in w at t0
12It might be true on a metaphoric reading, where one describes two distinct cultural parts of




( Z ⊆SE NEC(p(t0))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→w′ ∈ p(t0) ])
]
We predict that a topic time large enough to allow for the situation to unfold
will allow AAD readings, and we get those with past tense. These examples
gain AAD readings in that case, since the topic time can be significantly larger
than the event time, and the event has time to continue within the topic time
and still be in the past.
(49) Oklahoma was almost two states (but Congress said no).
If Congress had accepted Sequoyah’s proposal, the Oklahoma people
had proposed statehood, and Congress accepted that proposal too, etc.
(50) I almost lived in San Francisco (but I didn’t take the job)
If I had taken that job, moved to SF, not lost my job, stayed in SF, etc.
— Figure 4 is to be placed here —
NEC(p(t2))(w) A B C D E F G
t2
circ(w) Z
Figure 4: Unfolding after premises are added
4.4 Shifting creates room
Finding that AAD needs room in the topic time to be felicitous, and that the
present tense doesn’t provide that room, we predict that any operator that
shifts temporal interpretation away from the utterance time should allow AAD
with present tense, and it does. The present perfect works well with AAD.
(51) t0 I have almost met the President.
a. proximity: I have achieved most of the steps
b. AAD: I was going to meet him once, but I missed my bus to the
event.
Under an extended now model (Iatridou et al. 2001), the perfect, situated
between tense and aspect, introduces a ‘perfect time span’ leading up (7→) to
the topic time. This time span fills almost’s time argument. Since this time span
starts in the past and leads up to the present, the event can unfold within this
time span, giving room for AAD.
(52) J (51) Ku = λw. t0 ◦ τ(u) & ∃t′[ t′ 7→ t0 & J almost K([I meet the president](t′))(w) ]
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— Figure 5 is to be placed here —
NEC(p(t′))(w): A B C D E F G
perfect time span (t′)
circ(w) Z
t0
Figure 5: Unfolding of event under the perfect
One reviewer notes misgivings about the AAD judgment with the present
perfect in (51), but this construction does occur naturally, as in the tweet ”i
have almost gone to this same frat about seven times but chickened out every
time.”13 Our account predicts that AAD only occurs with the experiential read-
ing of the perfect, because the universal reading (53) does not involve change
over the time span, and the recent present reading (54) does not give enough
time for the event to culminate by the topic time. This prediction holds.
(53) I have almost lived in San Francisco for 10 years.
= (prox.) I have lived near SF for 10 years, or I have lived in SF for
nearly 10 years.
6= (AAD) For the last 10 years, I have nearly chosen to live in SF.
(54) I have almost met the President!
= (prox.) I just had an encounter where I nearly met the president
6= (AAD) I just missed the bus to go to the exclusive presidential event
where he was going to meet everyone.
The auxiliary will involves temporal displacement into the future, whether
it is modal or not (Klecha 2013). This displacement shifts forward from the
topic situation, enough to provide room for almost at-a-distance. Imagine that
a baseball player asks a fortune teller about a possible heroic play he might
make in the future. The soothsayer’s reply (55) can express AAD, where a
fielder catches the ball in flight (55b). This use of almost is visually represented
by Figure 6.
(55) You will almost hit a double.
a. λw. In all future worlds w′ there’s a time t′ that follows the current
topic time, such that there is a set of small enough conditions Z for
an event in t′ of you hitting a double, which do not hold of t′, and
in all worlds w′ where Z holds and normal uninterrupted outcomes
ensue, you hit a double.
13Tweet from 9 Feb 2019. https://twitter.com/ g a b b y/status/1094407630393626624.
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b. λw. t2 ◦ τ(u) & ∀w′[ future(w)(w′)→ ∃t′[ t′ t2 & J almost K([you hit
a double](t′))(w) ] ]
— Figure 6 is to be placed here —
NEC(p(t′))(w): A B C D E F G
shifted time span (t′)
circ(w) Z
t2
Figure 6: Unfolding of a future event
4.5 A further blocking effect
In this section we have shown several contexts that systematically block AAD.
All of these involve the inability of the modal continuation to lead to the event’s
completion during the topic time. We have also shown how temporal shifting
operators introduce a time span that allows the continuation to complete in
time, thereby unblocking AAD.
Other factors can rule out AAD as well. One interesting case involves cross-
ing the street. Imagine a friend Julie taking one step into the street before the
crossing event was cut short. Almost fails, even though AAD is predicted.14
(56) #Julie almost crossed the street, but a cyclist hit her.
The proximity reading is false in (56), and AAD is blocked. Our account’s
prediction is that something must be blocking AAD. It is not normality, because
the progressive works; she was crossing the street. However, something must
interfere with AAD, because similarly cut accomplishments do allow it.
Context: Julie was working on her roof when her foot slipped and she
started to lose her balance. At the first step she took, her foot caught a
shingle and stopped her from leaning over enough to fall.
(57) Julie almost fell off her roof, but her foot caught a shingle.
What might distinguish these cases, if not normal outcomes? We suspect it
actually is an effect due to the sense that the description of falling off the roof
is the ‘main event’ of the utterance, while crossing the street is not.
Essentially, when we recount an event as part of a discourse, we have cer-
tain ‘main events’ that include a number of intermediate event. AAD seems
to work better with the main events. If crossing a street is the main event, the
AAD reading is easier to obtain.
14We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this kind of example.
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Context: Julie was visiting Paris and window-shopping along the Champs-
Élysées. She saw a movie theater across the street and decided to check
it out. One step in, she was hit by a cyclist and had to go to the hospital.
(58) Julie almost crossed the Champs-Élysées, but a cyclist hit her.
People cross streets to get to the other side for a reason, and AAD works better
when modally projecting the success of the motivating event.
(59) Julie almost crossed the street to see a movie, but a cyclist hit her.
(60) Julie almost went to the theater, but a cyclist hit her.
We only have space to sketch out what we observe here, but further explo-
ration seems fruitful. Perhaps the necessary conditions for almost are affected
by a question under discussion, or a main event under discussion. Or maybe
crossing the street with an idea in mind requires that idea to be involved in the
necessary conditions. What we can say with certainty is that AAD’s availabil-
ity depends on a number of factors, some of which are difficult to ascertain.
In the next section we will discuss more factors, by extending our account to
almost in other projections and seeing how they systematically block AAD.
5 Almost at other projections
In this paper we have focused on what we call “verbal almost,” which is the use
of almost in the extended verbal projection above aspect and below tense. How-
ever, almost is routinely found at other points in the structure— with DPs, NPs,
VPs, PPs, and so forth. Our denotation fits all of these without requiring the
type-shifting or ambiguity in Morzycki (2001). In addition, we make a novel
observation: Almost at-a-distance is always blocked with these complements.
Only the proximity reading can hold.
5.1 Blocking the at-a-distance reading
A minimal pair reveals this fact well. If you are invited to a gala where ten
heads of state are attending, the necessary conditions for meeting all ten unfold
over the life of the party, so AAD is possible with a verbal complement (61).
You might not have met any, but if things had gone a little differently, you
would have met all ten.
(61) I almost [ met ten heads of state ].
proximity TRUE if you only met nine, because one left early.
AAD can be TRUE if your cab broke down on the way and you
didn’t meet any.
On the other hand, if almost directly takes ten heads of state as its complement,
AAD is not allowed– you must have met nearly all ten.
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(62) I met almost [ ten heads of state ].
proximity TRUE if you only met nine, because one left early.
AAD always FALSE if your cab broke down on the way and you
didn’t meet any.
The effect with non-verbal complements is pervasive, no matter which cat-
egory the complement belongs to.
(63) a. NP complement: Johanna was an [ almost [NP doctor ]],
#but failed to get into medical school.
b. AP complement: We gave the story an [ almost [AP happy ]] ending,
#but decided not to give it a clear ending at all.
c. PP complement: Becky arrived in Rome [ almost [PP at 3 pm ]],
#but her flight was cancelled and she never left London.
d. AdvP complement: The CEO prattled on [ almost [AdvP non-stop ]],
#but in the end decided not to say anything.
This effect undermines the common assumption in the literature of almost
as a proposition-level operator no matter where it occurs in the sentence (Penka
2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010; Kilbourn-Ceron 2017). Instead, this effect sup-
ports the findings of Rapp & von Stechow (1999) and Morzycki (2001) that
almost is interpreted in situ.
5.2 Applying the denotation across categories
Our denotation in (15) works with non-verbal constituents as well. Here are
just two examples, with quantifiers and adjectives, which show how the com-
position works. Let us begin by recapitulating the denotation of almost.
(64) J almost K = λφλαλw . ∃Z
[
( Z ⊆SE NEC(φ(α))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→w′ ∈ φ(α) ])
]
The meaning of almost happy becomes: There is a small-enough set of miss-
ing conditions Z for x to be happy in w, such that in worlds w′ you assume Z
along with the conditions that were actually met in w, then x is happy in w′.
(65) a. J happy K = λxλw. happy(x)(w) : 〈e, wt〉
b. J almost K(J happy K) : 〈e, wt〉
J almost K
〈〈e, wt〉, 〈e, wt〉〉
J happy K
〈e, wt〉
c. J almost happy K =
λxλw. ∃Z
[
( Z ⊆SE NEC(J happy K(x))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→ happy(x)(w′) ])
]
With a quantifier complement, the prejacent is just the quantifier itself. The
second argument of the quantifier becomes the second argument of almost.
31
(66) J every plant K = λQλw. ∀x[ plant(x)(w)→ Q(x)(w) ] : 〈〈e, wt〉, wt〉
J almost K
J every K J plant K
(67) J almost every plant K =
λQλw . ∃Z
[
( Z ⊆SE NEC(J every plant K(Q))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z )
& (∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→ J every plant K(Q)(w′)])
]
The meaning of almost every plant in (67) becomes: There is a small-enough
set of missing conditions Z for Q to apply to every plant in w, such that in
worlds w′ you assume Z along with the conditions that were actually met in
w, then Q applies to every plant in w′.
5.3 Understanding why AAD is blocked
Why is AAD blocked in these contexts? At first we could imagine that these
versions of almost lack the counterfactual condition. However, this denotation
would simply hold when there is a small enough set of necessary conditions
missing for the property to hold, and that is equivalent to negation. Instead, we
can keep the modal condition and rely on kinds of restrictions we have already
seen on necessary conditions and modal circumstances.
We have seen that almost at-a-distance is blocked when the necessary con-
ditions involve a sort of counting up after the fact, like the league standings
at the end of the season. If we assume that quantifiers’ necessary conditions
always involve this kind of ‘counting up’, we can capture the restriction. That
assumption raises the question of why it holds. The reason may be related
to the meaning of generalized quantifiers. As a generalized quantifying de-
terminer, every denotes a subset relation between its arguments such that the
first is a subset of the second. As Barwise & Cooper (1981/2002) point out, we
judge the truth of such a relation by pairing the members of the witness set
offered by the first argument to the members of the set offered by the second.
Applied to almost, if the first argument φ of almost denotes a quantifier, each
necessary condition must apply the second argument α to a distinct member
of the witness set in φ in w.15
For instance, imagine a context where members of a band of 10 fugitives
tries to climb Mount Everest to raise awareness to prison conditions (68). If 8
or 9 of them succeed, Q-almost holds on the proximity reading.
(68) Almost every fugitive climbed Mount Everest (in w0).
It does not hold on the proximity reading if only 4 of them climb the moun-
tain. It also does not hold on the at-a-distance reading, so in the case where
only 4 climb the mountain, (68) is simply false. Crucially, it is false even if the
15The nature of the complement of almost also governs the selection of scale selection in scalar
accounts in similar ways— the scale of almost every plant will involve the plants, and so forth.
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remaining six had begun climbing the mountain when they got caught. It is
true that each of the six fugitives almost climbed Mount Everest on the at-a-
distance reading (but they got caught). Thus, the blocking cannot be due to the
way the event could or could not unfold. Instead, the assumed restrictions on
necessary conditions forces them to apply the expression [λxλw. x climbed Mt
Everest in w] to each member of the set of fugitives.
(69) NEC(J 68 K)(w0) = { A: λw. Amy climbed Mount Everest in w,
B: λw. Beth climbed Mount Everest in w,
C: λw. Catherine climbed Mount Everest in w,
D: λw. Dana climbed Mount Everest in w,
E: λw. Eliza climbed Mount Everest in w
. . .}
One can envisage a context that should obtain AAD via normal outcomes
of adding the premises, but the normal outcomes do not have this effect, be-
cause the subset relation expressed by every requires the necessary conditions
to be counted up after the fact. Even if we add premises, there is no room for
the event to change after the fact when the counting up is conducted. If the
premises we add do not suffice to entail p, almost fails.
In this section we have applied our cross-categorial version of almost to
some other categories. We have also shown that the at-a-distance reading is
not available with these other categories, and propose that the complements
themselves impose necessary conditions that must be counted up afer the fact,
like the standings in the playoff example (31).
6 Avoiding the pitfalls of the polar condition
The polar condition of almost expresses that p doesn’t hold. In doing so, it trig-
gers a number of unwelcome consequences considering the negative operator
it contains. It does not license NPIs (70), is immune to evaluation (71), and
often seems to express an implicature (72, 73).
(70) a. Becky almost saw someone/*anyone.
b. * Becky almost played with Tom at all.
(71) Amazingly, I almost met 10 heads of state at the party
6→ It’s amazing that I did not meet 10 heads of state at the party
(72) We didn’t ALMOST win, we DID win.
(73) To pass, you have to get almost all the answers right
6→ If you get them all right, you fail.
The antecedent condition we propose involves an existential quantifier which
obviates the first two consequences. For the third, we discuss how almost is
sometimes subject to negation, and for the fourth we suggest that the pragmat-
ics can apply on the modal base rather than the scale involved with almost all.
We now address each of these in turn.
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6.1 Existential quantifiers are upward-entailing
Negation downward-entails and licenses NPIs, but almost upward-entails and
licenses PPIs (74), posing a major obstacle for a polar condition.
(74) a. I almost saw a dog 6⇒ I almost saw a green dog (no DE)
b. I almost saw a green dog. ⇒ I almost saw a dog (UE)
c. * I almost saw anyone. *We almost went at all. (no NPIs)
d. I almost saw someone. I almost believed him somewhat. (PPIs)
Penka (2006) suggests that this effect results from an intervention effect trig-
gered by a higher focus operator, but incompatibility with NPIs applies even
without one. Our denotation of almost in (15)/(64) predicts incompatibility
with NPIs. Its antecedent condition (75a) contains an existential quantifier: Its
domain is a set of missing conditions. The modal condition is in the nuclear
scope of that existential quantifier, which is an upward-entailing environment
(75b). The prejacent is in the nuclear scope of the universally quantified modal,
and that is also an upward entailing environment.
(75) a. ∃Z[ ( Z ⊆SE NEC(p(t))(w) & w 6∈
⋃
Z ) . . .
b. . . .∀w′[ w′ ∈ BestNI(R(circ(w),Z))→w′ ∈ p(t) ] ]
6.2 Immunity to evaluative adverbs
Nouwen (2006) makes a novel observation about almost: Evaluative adverbs
ignore the polar condition, despite taking scope over it.16 For instance, Amaz-
ingly, we almost won can mean that it’s amazing that we nearly won, but it can-
not mean that it’s amazing we didn’t win. This asymmetry is not predicted by
a simple polar condition in conjunction with a proximal condition. Nouwen
therefore suggests that the polar condition is not part of the assertion. How-
ever, the antecedent condition’s existential quantifier offers a reason why this
information is non-asserted: Existential quantifiers behave this way routinely.
(76) J Amazingly, we almost won in w K = λw. It’s amazing that [there’s a
small enough set of missing conditions for us winning such that in
all the modal worlds w′ where that set holds, we win]
Amazingly, a dog bit me cannot mean that it’s amazing that a dog existed. Like-
wise, (76) cannot mean it is amazing that there is a small enough set of missing
conditions. What is amazing is the nuclear scope of the existential— if that
small enough set had held, we would have won.17
16Horn (2011) offers further examples.
17A reviewer asks if the location in a domain restrictor makes this condition presupposed, but
existential quantifiers are generally weak, so their domain can be empty under negation (I didn’t
see a unicorn) and easily new to the discourse.
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6.3 The negation is truth-conditional
Alternatively, several accounts have proposed that the polar condition fails to
behave like asserted negation because it is not asserted. Sadock (1981) claims
it to be an implicature, Nouwen (2006) suggests a presupposition, and Horn
(2002) lands between, as a proposition lacking assertoric force. However, negat-
ing an almost-clause is possible. The meaning of almost contains a conjunction
between antecedent and modal conditions, so we predict two possibilities for
readings of negation with almost, and both can occur (77), showing that nega-
tion poses no necessary problems for the antecedent condition of almost.
(77) We didn’t almost win.
a. = We did win
(false antecedent condition: There are no small-enough subsets of
missing conditions)
b. = We weren’t even close
(false modal condition: Any small enough subset fails to entail)
Many people (including reviewers) have indicated to us that (77a) involves
metalinguistic negation. Following (Horn 1985, 1989), metalinguistic nega-
tion negates not the proposition, but rather an implicature already in the dis-
course. We almost won would implicate that we did not win, and the negation
negates that. These indications depend on the assumption that the implicature
is present, which itself rests on the idea that negating almost behaves like other
cases of metalinguistic negation with scalar interpretation. However, it differs
in two important ways.
The first involves direction on the scale. Scalar metalinguistic negation only
takes us higher on the scale (Moeschler 2018), since it negates the implicature
that the higher points on the scale don’t hold.
(78) a. Some dogs aren’t cute; all of them are.
b. * Some dogs aren’t cute; none of them are.
Going lower on the scale is a sign of truth-conditional negation.
(79) a. He’s not KINDA tall, he IS tall. [metalinguistic]
b. He’s not KINDA tall, he’s short. [# on metalinguistic]
Likewise, ‘not almost’ can go lower on the scale at least some of the time, so it
has truth-conditional effects.
(80) You didn’t almost win; you got clobbered.
The second difference from metalinguistic negation involves scalar entail-
ment. Quite generally, the meta-negated proposition is actually true. This is
especially true when replacing terms: We don’t BURY the DEAD here, we INTER
the DEPARTED. The proposition is still true with scalar metalinguistic nega-
tion, entailed as a corollary of how scales are interpreted. If all dogs are cute,
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some of them are. If negating almost were always metalinguistic, we would
predict this entailment property to apply in all cases, but that prediction does
not hold.
If Ted is home, ‘Ted is home’ does not entail that ‘Ted is almost home’ at
the topic time. Saying Ted is almost home would be plainly false. If a healthy
man named Ted dies instantaneously, ‘Ted died’ does not entail the truth of
‘Ted almost died’ for same time interval. Or consider the game of Quidditch
from the Harry Potter series, which has been adapted for earthbound play. You
can score points mainly in 10-point chunks, but the game ends when one team
grabs the snitch, which earns them 150 points. If a team is losing 120-0 and a
player grabs the snitch, they win 150-120, but it isn’t clear that they ever almost
won on the scoreboard reading. On other readings, they may have almost won
(e.g., the player had almost grabbed the snitch at one point), but if negating
almost were always metalinguistic, we would predict it to apply to all readings
and that prediction does not hold.
Ultimately, scalar metalinguistic negation is not applying to almost the way
we expect it would. We either have to conclude implausibly that almost p is
not available to be placed into a scale with other modifiers, or conclude that
it is not generating the implicature that metalinguistic negation targets. The
second is plausible and it is supported by the data shown. It is just as well,
for negating verbal almost is sometimes clearly truth-conditional. We saw this
already in (32), when the proposition that New York made the playoffs was
true or false depending on NEC. We can also generate more playoff cases with
negation where the participants do share necessary conditions, and the result
was lower than the threshold for almost.
(81) A: Look at that, we almost won!
B: No we didn’t. We were six places out of first.
(82) Context: Chicago finished in 9th, far from the 3rd place playoff cutoff
A: Chicago almost made the playoffs, right?
B: *Looks at standings* No.
If negating almost is naturally truth-conditional, why does it seem so meta-
linguistic? Barring uses where it actually is metalinguistic, we suspect that this
effect results from contrastive focus on almost, accompanied by a prominent
intonation. If focus is elsewhere, or the intonation is flat on almost, the negation
can be truth-conditional. We will not detour from our main discussion to try
and work out the details of this suspicion, since our point is to demonstrate
that negating almost has truth-conditional effects. This demonstration suffices
to show that the antecedent condition is asserted.18
18This effect also suggests that almost is not always a PPI, contrary to claims in the literature
(Spector 2014). We do not pursue this suggestion, in part because it strays from the topic at hand,
and in part because our examples and Spector’s are different. Our examples are generally echoic
in nature, since not almost is usually degraded out of the blue. Spector sets aside echoic examples
aside to focus on PPIs. It is true that not almost p is degraded without a lead-in, although it may be
blocked by the availability of p for one reading and not p for the other. Not to mention, PPI claims
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This assertion entails the content of a polar condition, but that entailment
does not get involved in the pragmatics. Spector (2014) points out that almost
is felicitous under a negated factive verb, but the polar condition does not con-
tribute to the factive attitude as we should expect if it is asserted. However, the
antecedent condition does contribute as an asserted condition should. Here is
a novel example of this sort to illustrate the point.
Context: Mary was married to a fisherman, but in 1850, her husband
was lost at sea in a gale. 150 years later, divers found the wreck of his
ship just 10 miles off shore.
(83) Mary never found out that her husband almost made it home that night.
If the classic polar condition is asserted, then it must be the case that Mary
never found that her husband didn’t make it home. However, she obviously
did find that out, so the classic polar condition isn’t asserted. However, our
antecedent condition contributes something different: Mary never found out
that there was a small enough set of missing conditions such that, had they
occurred with what did happen, he would have made it home that night. This
is compatible with her finding out that he didn’t make it home, which is only
entailed.
6.4 Almost in ‘at least’ contexts
Nouwen (2006) pointed out that asserting ‘not p’ is precluded by the ‘at least’
reading, as in (84), where you can still pass if you answer them all.
(84) If you want to pass the exam, you have to answer almost all questions correctly.
Cases like this have led to accounts that propose that almost implicates the
polar condition. To capture at least readings most of the time, (Spector 2013,
2014) proposes a exhausitivity operator. Essentially, almost p means ‘(at least)
close to p’ on a scale, and the operator closes off the higher points on the scale.
Exhaustification-based accounts allow for the modal in cases like this to block
an exhaustification operator from applying to almost, allowing the ‘at least’
reading to surface.
We are not sure how that account would work with almost at-a-distance,
where closeness does not hold and a modal is required for the higher points on
the scale. However, in this section we do want to point out that in some cases
we can derive the pragmatic effect here without a separate operator. Consider
the following example, based on Nouwen’s.
Context:
You will be taking an exam that has ten questions, where getting 8
correct is required to pass.
tend to involve quantifier-almost, which we have already shown to differ in significant ways from
verbal-almost, and that difference leads us astray again.
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(85) a. To pass the test, you have to get almost every answer right.
b. To pass the test, you have to get eight answers right.
Spector noticed that ‘at least’ readings are easily obtained when modality
is involved, and proposes that the modal blocks exhaustification. However,
the premise semantics of modals can do this work just as well without extra
operators. The modal base provides the goal that defines the worlds where the
obligation needs to be met. If the goal is to pass or do better, then in all those
worlds, you get exactly eight answers right. That is, almost every answer but
not every answer.
The ‘at least’ reading can also be attained pragmatically from the modal’s
premises. In (85b), one seems to imply that the goal is to pass or perhaps do
better. But if one makes that implicature overt with a verb meaning ‘get every
question right’, the consequent no longer holds.
(86) (same context: 10-question test)
a. #To pass or ace the test, you have to get eight answers right.
b. #To pass or ace the test, you have to get almost every answer right.
Instead, the goal can be always the minimum to pass: exactly 8. In that
case, the best ordered worlds in the assertion will be those where you score 8,
but not 9 or 10. These “8” worlds work with almost, too, because in all those
worlds, you almost score 10. Now, the pragmatics can still provide an ‘at least’
reading through a scalar implicature on the domain. If “8” worlds meet the
minimum, we can infer that in “9” worlds or “10” worlds we pass, too, whether
the prejacent still holds or not. This implicature is cancelable (87). Similar
pragmatics work with almost. The nuclear scope is false in worlds where you
score 10, but those are not at issue in the modal domain when you score 8,
except by cancelable implicature.
(87) a. To pass, you have to get 8 questions right. But watch out: If you get more
than 8 right, they’ll actually fail you.
b. To pass, you have to get almost every question right. But watch out: If you
get them all, they’ll actually fail you.
This discussion obviously cannot substitute for a full contribution to the de-
bate on at least/exactly readings, or on the nature of exhaustification operators,
which have proven useful in many domains. However, it does show how the
‘exactly’ reading is compatible with the pragmatics of premise-based modals,
and that compatibility permits an antecedent condition that is not implicated.
It seems to us that a synthesis of exhaustification operators with the modal
premises of almost offers a promising line of future research; indeed, perhaps
such an operator is creating the effect on the modal restrictor.
38
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that the meaning of almost requires an ex-
pression of scalar proximity and a modal expression for cases when proximity
fails. We argue that this modal employs the non-interrupting ordering source
found in the modal progressive, but differs from the progressive with respect to
temporal interpretation. Our approach distinguishes proximity readings from
at-a-distance readings, and we see that the at-a-distance readings show the
kinds of contextual variability we expect from premise-based modals with cir-
cumstantial modal bases.
Moreover, our re-orientation offers solutions to many of the mysteries con-
cerning the nature of almost, which arise from a polar condition that negates
the prejacent. Our antecedent condition instead entails the negation without
its problematic aspects with respect to entailment, polarity, and implicature.
Looking more broadly, we have seen that modality plays an important role
for formulating a sense of proximity, at least when we discuss the completion
of eventualities. Our account also adds to the growing list of modal expres-
sions used throughout the semantics, and lends further support for the use
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